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Abstract—Comprehensive specifications are essential for vari-
ous activities across the entire validation continuum for system-
on-chip (SoC) designs. However, specifications are often am-
biguous, incomplete, or even contain inconsistencies or errors.
This paper addresses this problem by developing a specification
mining approach that automatically extracts sequential patterns
from SoC transaction-level traces such that the mined patterns
collectively characterize system-level specifications for SoC de-
signs. This approach exploits long short-term memory (LSTM)
networks trained with the collected SoC execution traces to
capture sequential dependencies among various communication
events. Then, a novel algorithm is developed to efficiently extract
sequential patterns on system-level communications from the
trained LSTM models. Several trace processing techniques are
also proposed to enhance the mining performance. We evaluate
the proposed approach on simulation traces of a non-trivial
multi-core SoC prototype. Initial results show that the proposed
approach is capable of extracting various patterns on system-level
specifications from the highly concurrent SoC execution traces.
I. INTRODUCTION
Well-formed and comprehensive specifications are essen-
tial for various system-on-chip (SoC) validation activities. In
practice, such specifications are often ambiguous, incomplete,
or even contain inconsistencies or errors. Moreover, as a
SoC design gradually progresses across design stages, the
connection between the original specifications and the design
implementation may become imprecise and disjoint. The lack
of accurate specifications may lead to potential misunder-
standings of the design behavior, and cause unintentional
misbehavior to be implemented. It also hinders effective debug
process. In order to address those challenges, an automatic
system specification extraction method is crucial for effective
SoC validation.
In the literature, many existing methods allow extracting
specifications from system execution traces. However, they are
mainly designed for software, and cannot be directly applied
to SoC designs. In this paper, we consider the concurrent
nature of SoC designs, where execution traces are results
from executing a number of message flows in parallel. In the
proposed specification mining approach, the state-of-art LSTM
neural networks, which are effective at capturing sequential
dependencies, are trained with the SoC execution traces. Sub-
sequently, sequential patterns are automatically extracted from
the trained LSTM models, where message flow specifications
can be formed from the mined sequential patterns.
The contribution of this paper is a novel sequential pattern
mining framework that automatically extracts sequential pat-
terns from inherently concurrent SoC execution traces. These
patterns may be recurrent in individual traces, and repeat
themselves in multiple different traces. Even though the type
of execution traces and the type of mined sequential patterns
are considered in separation in some previous work, to the
best of our knowledge, this is the first work that both features
are considered in a single mining framework.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the
existing related work. Section III and IV introduce the basic
definitions and concepts. Section V presents our specification
mining framework. Section VI discusses the experimental
results, and Section VII concludes this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Whereas numerous researches are conducted to extract
sequential patterns from traces of software programs [2]–[4],
[8]–[10], they are not specifically designed for concurrent
programs. The work in [4] extracts assertions automatically
by applying data mining methodologies to simulations traces
of digital hardware designs. The work in [8] uses the similar
concept on transaction-level traces. However, both approaches
cannot handle concurrency that commonly exists in complex
SoC execution traces. The approaches proposed in [1], [5],
[7], [10], [12] target traces of the concurrent system. They
show that common model-inference algorithms are not directly
applicable to distributed concurrent system executions. Cloud-
Seer, proposed in [12], is a specification inference approach
that can be applied to anomaly detection. It requires a set
of log files with repeated executions of only one single task,
which makes it infeasible for SoC traces. For the same reason,
works in [1], [10] are also limited.
In practice, a highly concurrent program often has multiple
tasks running concurrently, with their log entries interleaved
with each other. A recent work, BaySpec [11], uses a dy-
namic mining approach to extracts formal specifications from
Bayesian models. This work, unfortunately, cannot be applied
to SoC traces as it requires clean trace slicing (requires
functional segmentation), which is impractical. The work in
[5] suffers the similar issue. Another work in [7] presents an
approach that constructs a Prefix Tree Acceptor (PTA) from
software traces. It then extracts and combines patterns from
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the constructed PTA. It also requires traces be properly sliced
in order to construct the PTA.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In architectural documents, system-level protocols are often
represented as message flows, therefore they are also referred
to as system flows in this paper.
Definition 1: A system flow is defined as a tuple F =
(P, T,E, L) where P is a finite set of places, T is a finite set
of transitions, E is a finite set of events, and L : T → E is a
labeling function that maps each transition t ∈ T to an event
e ∈ E.
An SoC typically implements several flows denoted as ~F . In
this paper, Fi ∈ ~F denotes one such flow. An example of
memory write flow from CPUs is shown in Fig. 1 where each
transition is labeled with an index tx and an event of the form
(A:B:C)
For each transition t ∈ T , its preset, denoted as •t ⊆ P ,
is the set of places connected to t, and its postset, denoted as
t• ⊆ P , is the set of places that t is connected to. A state s ⊆
P of a flow is a subset of places marked with tokens. Each flow
has two special states: s0 ⊆ P is the set of initially marked
states, also referred to as the initial state, and the end state
s⊥ ⊆ P is the set of end states not going to any transitions.
Each flow is associated with one start and several end events.
An event e ∈ E is a start event if e = L(t) and •t ⊆ s0. An
event e ∈ E is an end event if e = L(t) and t• ⊆ s⊥. In
Figure 1, s0 = {p1}, and s⊥ = {p9}, its start event is t1, and
its end event is the one labeled for transitions t8, t9 and t10.
The occurrence of a start event indicates the beginning of a
flow execution, while the occurrence of an end event indicates
the complete of a flow execution. A transition t can be fired
in a state s if •t ⊆ s. Firing t causes the labeled event to be
emitted, and leads to a new state s′ = (s−•t)∪ t•. Therefore,
executing a flow induces a sequence of events. Execution of
a flow completes if its s⊥ is reached.
Definition 2: An execution of a flow F is a sequence
of events (e0, e1, . . . , en) such that there is a sequence of
transition firings (t0, t1, . . . , tn) of F where the following
conditions hold.
• ∀0 ≤ i ≤ n, ei = L(ti),
• ∀0 < i ≤ n, •ti ⊆ ti−1•,
• s0 ⊆ •t0, and tn• ⊆ s⊥.
The above definition indicates that an execution of F is the
results of a sequence of transition firings from the initial state
to the end state where transition ti is causally dependent on
ti−1. For example, the flow in Figure 1 has three executions:
{t1, t10}, {t1, t2, t3, t9} and {t1, t2, t3, t4, t5, t6, t7, t8}. Note
that the transition numbers are used to represent events in the
above example for simplicity.
Definition 3: During an execution of an SoC design, in-
stances of flows ~F that it implements are executed. Suppose
that the set of flow instances executed is {Fi,j | Fi ∈ ~F}. An
SoC execution yields a trace ρ
ρ = (E0, E1, . . . , En)
the constructed PTA. It also requires traces be properly sliced
in order to construct the PTA.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In architectural documents, system-level protocols are often
represented as message flows, therefore they are also referred
to as system flows in this paper.
Definition 1: A system flow is defined as a tuple F =
(P, T,E, L) where P is a finite set of places, T is a finite set
of transit ons, E s a finite set of events, and L : ! E is a
labeling function that maps each transition t 2 T to an event
e 2 E.
An SoC ty ically implem ts several flows denoted as ~F . In
this paper, Fi 2 ~F denotes one such flow. An example of
memory write flow from CPUs is shown in Fig. 1 where each
transition is labeled with an index tx and an event of the form
(A:B:C)
For each transition t 2 T , its preset, denoted as •t ✓ P ,
is the set of places connected to t, and its postset, denoted as
t• ✓ P , is the set of places that t is connected to. A state s ✓
P of a flow is a subset of places marked with tokens. Each flow
has two special states: s0 ✓ P is the set of initially marked
states, also referred to as the initial state, and the end state
s? ✓ P is the set of end states not going to any transitions.
Each flow is associated with one start and several end events.
An event e 2 E is a start event if e = L(t) and •t ✓ s0. An
event e 2 E is an end event if e = L(t) and t• ✓ s?. In
Figure 1, s0 = {p1}, and s? = {p9}, its start event s t1, and
its end event is the one labeled for transitions t8, t9 and t10.
The occurrence of a start ev nt ndicates the beginning of a
flow execution, while the occurren e of an nd ev nt indicates
the complete of a flow execution. A transition t can be fired
in a state s if •t ✓ s. Firing t causes the labeled event to be
emitted, and leads to a new state s0 = (s •t)[ t•. Therefore,
executing a flow induces a sequence of events. Execution of
a flow completes if its s? is reached.
Definition 2: An execution of a flow F is a sequence
of events (e0, e1, . . . , en) such that there is a sequence of
transition firings (t0, t1, . . . , tn) of F where the following
conditions hold.
• 80  i  n, ei = L(ti),
• 80 < i  n, •ti ✓ ti 1•,
• s0 ✓ •t0, and tn• ✓ s?.
The above definition indicates that an execution of F is the
results of a sequence of transition firings from the initial state
to the end state where transition ti is causally dependent on
ti 1. F r example, the flow in Figure 1 has three executions:
{t1, t10}, {t1, t2, t3, t9} and {t1, t2, 3, t4, t5, t6, t7, t8}. Note
that the transition numbers are used to repres nt ev nts in the
above example for simplicity.
Definition 3: During an execution of an SoC design, in-
stances of flows ~F that it implements are executed. Suppose
that the set of flow instances executed is {Fi,j | Fi 2 ~F}. An
SoC execution yields a trace ⇢
⇢ = (E0, E1, . . . , En)
p1
t1 : (CPU X : Cache X : wr req)
p2
t2 : (Cache X : Cache X
0 : snp wr req)p3
t3 : (Cache X
0 : Cache X : snp wr resp)
p4
t4 : (Cache X : Bus : wr req) p5
t5 : (Bus : Mem : rd req)p6
t6 : (Mem : Bus : rd resp) p7
t7 : (Bus : Cache X : wr resp)p8
t8 : (Cache X : CPU X : wr resp)
t9 : (Cache X : CPU X : wr resp)
t10 : (Cache X : CPU X : wr resp)
p9
Fig. 1. LPN formalization of a CPU write protocol.
where Ei = {ei,0, ...ei,k} is a set of events executed at time
i, and ei,⇤ 2
S
Ei,j for every ei,⇤ 2 Ei.
Intuitively, an SoC execution trace is the result of parallel
execution of multiple instances of different flows. It is a
sequence of sets of events where orderings of events in the
same set of a trace are indistinguishable.
Given a trace ⇢ and two events ei and ej , we define ei < ej
if ei 2 Ei, ej 2 Ej , and i < j. This notation is naturally
extended to sequences of events.
In a system flow, an event is a tuple (src : dest : cmd
{data field}) where cmd is a command sent from a
source component src to a destination component dest, and
data field represents the payload information carried by the
event. It can be addr that carries the memory address at the
target block where cmd is applied, or other information like
sequence ID and tag to identify an event. The information
defining an event can be classified as static including src,
dest and cmd, and dynamic including various data field
which is generated during SoC execution.
In this paper, we consider all the static information of an
event for mining. Without loss of generality, we also consider
dynamic information addr of data field for mining as well.
All other types of dynamically generated information are not
considered. However, users can selectively use them in the
mining process to achieve better results.
IV. SEQUENTIAL PATTERNS
This paper considers mining message flows implemented
in SoC on-chip fabric. Since these flows are implemented in
hardware, mined flows, if valid, must be invariant on different
execution traces. In particular, this paper considers mining
sequential patterns, each of which corresponds to an execution
of a message flow.
Definition 4: A sequential pattern p is a sequence of events
such that
• It consists of at least two events, and
• All its events are unique.
Fig. 1. LP f r li ti of a CPU write protocol.
where Ei = {ei,0, . , set of events executed at ime
i, and ei,∗ ∈
⋃
i,j f r e er i,∗ ∈ Ei.
Intuitively, an SoC execution trace is the result of parallel
execution of multiple instances of different flows. It is a
sequence of sets of events where orderings of events in the
same set of a trace are indistinguishable.
Given a trace ρ and two events ei and ej , we define ei < ej
if ei ∈ Ei, ej ∈ Ej , and i < j. This notation is naturally
extended to sequences of events.
In a system flow, an event is a tuple (src : dest : cmd
{data field}) where cmd is a command sent from a
source component src to a destination component dest, and
data field represents the payload information carried by the
event. It can be addr that carries the memory address at the
target block where cmd is applied, or other information like
sequence ID and tag to identify an event. The information
defini g an eve t can be classified as static including src,
dest and cmd, and dynamic inclu ing various data field
which is generated duri g SoC execution.
In this paper, we consider all the s atic information of an
event for mining. Without loss of generality, we also consider
dynamic information addr of data field for mining as well.
All other types of dynamically generated information are not
considered. However, users can selectively use them in the
mining process to achieve better results.
IV. SEQUENTIAL PATTERNS
This paper considers mining message flows implemented
in SoC on-chip fabric. Since these flows are implemented in
hardware, mined flows, if valid, must be invariant on different
executi traces. In particular, this paper considers mining
sequential patterns, each of which correspo ds to an execution
of a message flow.
Definition 4: A sequential pattern p i a sequence of events
such that
• It consists of at leas two events, and
• All its events are unique.
If ground truth patterns are known, validity of mined pat-
terns can be defined with respect to the ground truth patterns.
Definition 5: A mined pattern pm is valid if there is a ground
truth (GT) pattern pt such that for every pair of events ei and
ej in pm, ei < ej in pm if ei < ej in pt. A mined pattern pm
is invalid if it is not valid.
In the simple example below, pm is a mined pattern. pm is
valid with respect to pt as sequential dependencies between
any pair of events in pm also exists in pt.
pm : (0, 13, 15, 23)
pt : (0, 8, 12, 13, 15, 23, 24, 25)
Next, we show an interesting property that helps identify
valid patterns. It captures the cause-effect relation between
two events, and it is based on the following observation: any
event in an execution trace is generated by a component in a
SoC design in reaction to an input event.
Definition 6: For two events ei and ej in a trace such that
ei < ej , they satisfy the causality property if
ei.dest = ej .src.
An execution in a message flow specifies a sequence of
such relations. Therefore, for a pattern (e0, e1, . . . , ek) where
0 ≤ i < k to be valid, every two consecutive events ei and
ei+1 in the pattern must satisfy the causality property.
V. MINING FRAMEWORK
Figure 2 shows the overview of the proposed mining frame-
work. It accepts a set of SoC execution traces, and mines
sequential patterns from those traces in three consecutive
stages as described below.
A. Trace Processing
Modern SoC model are often highly concurrent, and can
execute multiple flows simultaneously. As a result, it is
possible that two unrelated events may follow a temporal
dependency in execution traces. Since our mining framework
infers causality dependencies from temporal ones, those false
temporal dependencies can lead to many invalid patterns to be
mined. To address that problem, this section presents several
trace processing methods to separate unrelated events.
The goal of trace processing is to slicing an SoC execution
trace into a set of sub-traces such that unrelated events are
separated into different sub-traces as much as possible. Effec-
tiveness of trace slicing depends on available information from
the traces. In general, if more micro-architectural information
is available for trace slicing, the mining performance would
be better as more false dependencies among unrelated events
can be eliminated. Without loss of generality, two trace slicing
techniques are described below.
a) Address Slicing: This technique assumes that events
carry memory addresses addr that are usually available for
memory related tasks. For example, the event of any down-
stream read or write flows contains the target address for read
or write. Multiple flow instances may share the same target
block address, therefore events with the same addr are not
guaranteed to be correlated. However, when events carries
different addr values, they are always unrelated, thus can
be separated. For example, consider the following trace over
e1, e2 and e3.
({e1(10)}, {e2(10), e1(15)}, {e3(10), e2(15)}, {e1(15)})
(1)
Each bracket indicates the set of events executed at the same
clock cycle, and the value inside the parentheses indicates the
value of the addr data filed. For example, e1(10) represents
the instance of event e1 with address 10. Address slicing slices
such trace into two sub-traces as shown below with respect to
different addr values. In the resulting sub-traces, all events in
a single trace carry the same addr value.
addr = 10 : {{e1}, {e2}, {e3}}
addr = 15 : {{e1}, {e2}, {e1}}
b) Causality Slicing: This trace slicing technique con-
siders the causality property discussed in Definition 6 in
Section IV, and tries to separate events that do not follow
causality property into different sub-traces. This algorithm
starts with an execution trace and an empty set st to hold
sub-traces. Then, it iterates through each individual event ex
in the trace, and check if it satisfies the causality property
with any existing sub-traces. Let (e0, . . . , ei) be a sub-trace.
If ei.dest = ex.src, ex is added to the back of the sub-trace.
Otherwise, a new sub-trace is added to the set st with ex
inserted.
To illustrate the basic idea of causality slicing, consider the
simple example trace ρ below
ρ = (e0, e1, e2, e3).
The source and destination of each event is shown in Table I.
The destination of e0 matches with the source of e2. As the
same way, e1 matches with e3, forming to two sub-traces, as
shown below on the right.
Event Src Dest
e0 A B
e1 D E
e2 B C
e3 E F
TABLE I
ρ0: (e0, e2)
ρ1: (e1, e3)
This example shows the ideal scenario for the causality
slicing. However, one event may satisfy the causality property
with multiple sub-traces. When this situation happens, and
only limited information is available to determine which sub-
trace an event belongs to, those sub-traces are combined into
a single sub-trace, and that event is added to the combined
sub-trace. This is to maintain the original temporal orderings,
and at the same time to avoid introducing false dependencies
among events.
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B. LSTM Training
Neural networks have shown its significant impacts in
various fields in recent years [6]. In this paper, we explore
the recurrent neural networks (RNNs), a special type of neural
networks that is designed to capture sequential dependencies.
Architecture. We use a particular type of RNNs, Long Short
Term Memory (LSTM) networks, in this paper. An LSTM is
able to capture the “long-term dependencies” compared to
regular RNNs. The basic LSTM unit is composed of a cell,
an input gate, an output gate, and a forget gate. At each time
step, an LSTM block uses these gates to decide the portions of
the information to retain and update its state, and to produce
the new output ht for the connected block. Each LSTM unit
contains a set of weights that controls how the gates operate.
Training an LSTM model is the process of assigning the proper
values to the weights of the network. For this work we use the
categorical cross-entropy loss function to calculate the model
errors which are then used to update the weights of each unit.
Fig. 3 shows the structure of the LSTM models used in
Fig. 2. It is composed of two hidden layers, an input layer and
an output layer, using standard encoding-decoding algorithms.
Every layer contains a set of recurrent LSTM units, one for
each unique event in the traces for training.
The input layer of an LSTM model encodes each unique
event in an input trace with an one-hot vector ~x. Then, as the
hidden layer updates its states, the LSTM model calculates the
likelihood of an event being executed in the next time step.
The output layer decodes the final output into a probability
distribution function using a standard multinomial logistic
function. The probability distribution is represented as a set
of P (eh+1 | w) for each unique event eh+1 where w is a
sequence of events (e0, . . . , eh).
Training. In the proposed approach, the patterns are grouped
by their lengths (the numbers of events in a pattern). We create
a set of LSTM models, one for patterns of a fixed length. As
the desired patterns are often unknown, this approach allows
flexibility in various patterns that can be mined. Pattern lengths
for mining can be specified by the user.
For a LSTM model targeting at w−length patterns, a set of
pairs (S, ew) are generated from the input traces for training.
S is a sub-sequence of w − 1 events occurred in w − 1 time
steps before ew. S is used as an input, while ew is used as
the output label for S. Let ρ be a sequence of k events as our
training trace:
ρ = (e0, e1 . . . ek−1)
This approach considers the set of all pairs of (S, ew) out of
ρ. For this example, it includes
{(e0 . . . ew−2), ew−1) . . . (ek−w . . . ek−2}, ek−1)}
C. Pattern Extraction
After all LSTM models are properly trained, a pattern
extraction process is then applied to each model in sequence,
as shown in Fig. 2. For a model trained for pattern length w,
it takes a sequence of w−1 events as input, and computes the
output probability distribution for all unique events. We use θ
to define the minimum probability for a sequence of events to
be considered as a pattern. Consequently, our framework only
extracts patterns whose probabilities exceed the predefined
threshold θ.
In order to extract all valid patterns, we need to consider
all possible input event sequences S, and check their out-
put probability distributions. However, as the pattern length
increases, the number of such sequences for consideration
grows exponentially, leading to high runtime complexity. To
address this problem, we propose to chain the models in the
ascending order with regard to their pattern lengths so that
valid patterns extracted from one model are used as inputs of
the next model for extracting longer patterns. Only the first
model considers all input sequences of single events. In this
setup, if a sequence is not identified as a pattern, then any
extension of such sequence will not be considered as a pattern.
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VI. EXPERIMENTS
A. Setup
To evaluate the presented framework, a non-trivial SoC
model is developed, as shown in Figure 4. We implement a
total of 10 message flows in this model, including cache co-
herence, downstream read/write protocols for CPUs, upstream
read/write for the peripheral blocks, etc. Those flows, although
simplified, are adapted from real industry designs. The model
is simulated in a random test environment where CPUs and
four other peripheral blocks are programmed to randomly
select a flow to initiate with a delay between 1 to 10 cycles.
In a simulation run, each of those blocks activates 100 flow
instances, and a total of 500 flow instances are activated during
the entire simulation. We demonstrate the proposed message
flow mining framework on this SoC model by showing various
patterns it can extract. We also present the effects of several
post-processing techniques that show great potential in filtering
invalid patterns.
B. Results
Two hundred execution traces of the SoC model are col-
lected for experiments. Each trace is generated by simulating
the SoC model with a different random seed so that a diverse
set of traces are generated for training. These execution traces
are used to train the LSTM models with different pattern
lengths. The training process is conducted on a GPU cluster
with about 100 GPUs. The training process of each model
takes approximately 20− 30 minutes.
Fig. 5 shows the numbers of mined patterns from the orig-
inal traces, address-sliced traces, and causality-sliced traces
considering different probability thresholds for pattern extrac-
tion. The x−axis of Fig. 5 represents the pattern lengths, and
the y−axis represents the number of mined patterns for a pat-
tern length. The figure shows four sets of experimental results
from using thresholds of 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, and 0.8, respectively.
The results from using a threshold are shown with an unique
color. The definition of θ can be found in Section V-C. It
can be seen that the number of mined patterns significantly
increases when a slicing technique is used. Moreover, when
θ = 0.8, no patterns can be extracted from the original
trace, while both sliced traces generate over 100 patterns with
different lengths. It also shows that less patterns are mined as
the threshold increases. Every time the threshold increases by
0.2, the mined patterns from the original traces reduce by more
Fig. 5. Mined patterns of original traces and sliced traces with different
thresholds θ
than 50%. Such reduction also occurs for the sliced traces, but
at a much lower rate.
Tables II and III show the detailed results mined from the
original traces, and sliced traces using both slicing techniques,
respectively, with the threshold θ = 0.2. We use V to represent
valid patterns, IV for Invalid patterns, F for mined (found)
patterns, and NF for not-found patterns. Note that the above
notations are defined with respect to the ground truth patterns
implemented for the SoC model. The comparison between
Tables II and III shows the significant effect of trace slicing
techniques. The total number of mined valid patterns increases
from 28 to 257. A side effect is that the many more invalid
patterns are also mined. This is because that the slicing
techniques eliminate many false dependencies in the original
traces, leading to a more concentrated probability distribution
among events remained in the sliced traces. As a result, more
patterns, including both valid and invalid ones, can be mined.
In Tables II and III, the numbers in boldface are for the
increased valid patterns or decreased invalided patterns, and
the numbers in red are for the increased invalid patterns.
The results in Table III reveal two issues. First, the num-
ber of mined invalid patterns is much higher compared to
the mined valid patterns, especially for patterns with longer
lengths. Second, the number of valid patterns that is mined
is low considering the overall valid patterns. We propose
techniques below to address those issues.
a) Causality filtering: This technique leverages the
causality property in Definition 6 to avoid generating patterns
that violate the property. Specifically, given an input sequence
(e1, . . . , ew−1), even if the trained LSTM model returns event
ew such that P (ew|e1, . . . , ew−1) is above the given threshold,
sequence (e1, . . . , ew−1, ew) will not be returned as a pattern
if ew−1 and ew do not meet the causality property. Table IV
Length 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
V&F 21 6 1 0 0 0 0
IV&F 24 50 65 74 83 99 121
V&NF 97 140 139 130 118 88 44
TABLE II
MINED PATTERNS OF THE ORIGINAL TRACE WITH θ = 0.2
Length 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
V&F 56 45 36 34 39 32 19
IV&F 16 38 59 80 99 130 183
V&NF 62 101 104 96 79 56 25
TABLE III
MINED PATTERNS OF THE SLICED TRACE WITH θ = 0.2
Length 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
V&F 56 45 36 34 39 32 19
New IV&F 4 14 21 31 37 44 66
V&NF 62 101 104 96 79 56 25
TABLE IV
MINED PATTERNS AFTER APPLYING CAUSALITY FILTERING
Length 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
V&F 79 80 70 57 57 42 23
IV&F 8 31 59 89 108 120 146
V&NF 39 66 50 73 61 46 21
TABLE V
MINED PATTERNS AFTER APPLYING ADDITIONAL THRESHOLD
shows that this technique can lead to significant reduction
in the numbers of mined invalid patterns compared with the
results on row IV&F in Table III.
b) Additional threshold for model input generation:
Our approach uses a threshold to avoid invalid patterns during
the pattern extraction. However, it fails to consider the case
where a low probability sequence could be a prefix of a
longer pattern with sufficiently high probability. To address
this issue, we use an additional threshold θ′ such that θ′ < θ
to generate candidate input sequences for extracting longer
patterns. Table V shows the results from using this technique
where θ′ = 0.05 and θ remains at 0.2. The number of mined
valid patterns in Table V increases to 408 in total from 261
in Table IV. However, as more sequences are considered for
pattern extraction in each step, more invalid patterns are also
mined as shown by the numbers in red.
c) Initiating Event Filtering: According to Definition
2, an execution of a message flow is a sequence of events
from the initial state. As a result, a pattern that represents an
execution of a flow should start with an initiating event. If
the initiating events can be identified from execution traces,
we can limit the scope of valid patterns to be mined. In
the following, we show a simple method to identify the
initiating events from the execution traces. Given a set of
traces Φ for pattern mining, event e is an initiating event if
e.src 6= e′.dest for all e′ < e in ρ for all ρ ∈ Φ.
Once all initiating events are identified using this technique,
our approach can return patterns started with those initiating
events. Among all ground truth patterns of the implemented
message flows, this technique allows 2 out of 4 two-event
patterns, 5 out of 10 four-event patterns, and 23 out of 44
eight-event patterns to be extracted.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper presents an approach that automatically extracts
message flow specifications from SoC transaction-level traces.
It includes several trace processing techniques that reduce false
sequential dependencies while preserving the essential ones in
SoC execution traces. It utilizes the innovative LSTM models
to capture sequential dependencies in the traces for pattern
extraction. We apply this approach on the execution traces
of a non-trivial multicore SoC model, and evaluate quality
of mined specifications. In the future, we plan to optimize it
to consider various dynamic information available in a event,
and further improve the quality of extracted specifications by
reducing invalid patterns while increasing valid patterns.
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